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
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Attempt at Glasnost Results in Reassignment to Afghanistan

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[Article by Lt Col N. Belan, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent: "Restructuring: A Critical Situation. Telling the Truth to One's Face." passages in boldface as published]

[Text] The voice of Lt Col A. Smirnov grumbled in the telephone receiver.

"Aleksandr Ivanovich," I asked him, "perhaps you got excited at the party meeting?"

"No," he shot back firmly. "I am ready to repeat everything that I said then."

It was not long ago that Smirnov served in the Personnel Directorate of the Turkestan Military District. Now he has a new position—he is the chief of staff of a unit [chast] in the organization of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Thus, I did not meet with him—I phoned him from Tashkent, and he was on Afghan soil.

A complicated and very conflicting story which I had heard in the Turkestan MD prompted me to contact him. This is what happened here in the personnel directorate of the district: Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov was instructed to give a report at one of the party meetings. He spoke and gave such a report that arguments are going on about him to this day. He said at that time:

"In resolving many urgent problems, our party organization stands on positions that are old, habitual and convenient to individual communists. Servility and conservatism still flourish in our midst."

But the worst is still to come. Smirnov talked about the unscrupulousness and irresponsibility of some communists, of their shortsightedness and formalism in their work, and of the suppression of glasnost and the concealment of drunkenness. In conclusion, he proposed that the work of the party organization and its buro be considered unsatisfactory and that another election be held for party buro and secretary.

This was like an exploding bomb.

"The report was more like an indictment, and it was biased," communist L. Bugayev declared in the debate.

"Some of the facts in it are not corroborated and require checking," said communist V. Gusev.

It was decided to appoint a party inquiry to clarify whether Smirnov was right. The inquiry was conducted. We will not go into detail; the conclusion is important. And it was as follows: the criticism directed at the party organization and the buro was groundless.

The deeper I got into the details of this story, the more did I begin to think about how difficult are the lessons of glasnost and the understanding that glasnost is not only words but also deeds. And at times not enough energy is expended on it.

The job Smirnov proposed is to bring one's own house in order. And this requires telling the truth, the whole truth, to the end, and to call things by their real names.

... At a party meeting preceding the one at which Smirnov gave his report, communists of the personnel directorate discussed the question about ways for restructuring work with personnel. And as if in extension of this conversation, they discussed the second point of the agenda: approval of party character references [partiyaya kharakteristika] for communists who were being promoted in the service. There it is, the concrete embodiment of today's ideas—the participation of the party organization in the resolution of personnel problems.

"They heard the party character reference on comrade Volkov, N. I.; they resolved to approve the character reference, and they voted—so many 'for' and 'none' against."

Each time they voted unanimously. Not one "against." But where would they have gone with this "against?" Since approval of a character reference is a downright fraud. If it did not carry at a meeting, it simply would be falsified.

Smirnov talked about this very thing in his report. He was indignant, seeing the fact of eyewash as disdain toward communists and toward himself personally. They say they will vote all the same, and you can confidently write: everyone is "for."

And this is in a personnel outfit after they had just been saying: some might, but we above all must set an example of responsibility, maturity and honor. Well, what are these words worth? This is exactly the way Smirnov put the question.

What was the reaction? They approved the character references with antedates. When, by the way, they had already appointed one of the officers. But when they were reporting the materials from the party inquiry, they tried to appease the people:

"At the present time, the character references are approved, and there are no deviations from the standards of party life."

And there is no evaluation of what has occurred.

"But these character references are copies of those that we gave while recently conducting party certification of communists," said Col I. Kholodnyy, secretary of the party buro.

It turned out, according to his words and the reaction of the party organization, that there was no particular violation and that they simply did not observe formalities, and Smirnov aggravated the conversation for nothing. But was it really that way? But any doubts were soon dispelled, when I learned how this same certification to which Kholodnyy referred had transpired. Here is an example.

A party meeting is under way. At first, there is a review of the personnel file of communist G. Bartenev who, "being in an intoxicated state, kicked up a row at home." Bartenev was reproved. And immediately after, they approve his character reference in which it is written: "Not disposed to use alcoholic beverages; advocates sobriety."

Perhaps this is a unique case. By no means. Party buro secretary Colonel Kholodnyy himself stigmatized communist Maj V. Alekseyev for drunkenness, and a month later, during party certifications, they wrote in Alekseyev's character reference how he correctly understands "the great need to observe personal discipline."

Character reference [kharakteristika] comes from the word "character" [kharakter]. But the character of not only the one for whom it is written, but also of those who do the writing, and who give the reference a "good." In this specific instance, it is for the party organization: the extent to which it is alert and principled.

And if we are to converse on this plane, then how can we not agree with communist Smirnov, who said bluntly:

"We have not gotten used to facing the truth, and to this day we fear it, for it is so unusual."

One cannot help but think about this. Every communist at the meeting "wrote" his own character reference by the position he took and by his attitude toward what Smirnov said. What he is and the worth of words about principle, honor and implacability in standing up for the ideas of restructuring. But, apparently, it was more convenient to hold the view that was expressed in the inquiry findings.

Indeed, when Lt Col Smirnov spoke in his report about drunkenness he did not mention specific names. But people still understood him. And I did not have any particular difficulty in finding out these facts. All that it takes is to look at the minutes of the party meetings. However, the fact of why he recommended that party buro member Col V. Bartkevich be relieved of his position was not known to many. Bartkevich twice turned up for service with the smell of alcohol on his breath. At first, Maj Gen V. Gusev, chief of the personnel directorate, gave him a warning, and he reprimanded

him severely the second time. Members of the buro had serious talks with him, but, as the saying goes, not for the record. And this was hidden from the rank and file of communists. Lt Col Smirnov made this public. But once again all points of view were smoothed over. It is said that the chief of the directorate decided to limit himself to disciplinary punishment—what kind of "concealment of drunkenness" is there here?

The decision of the chief does not need to be discussed. However, it is not this that Smirnov asked to be done, but to give a party evaluation of Bartkevich's delinquency, and he was exasperated with the "truncated glasnost: the rank and file communists are not allowed to know that which the party buro members are permitted to know." It is precisely this kind of semi-glasnost that gives rise to people's passivity and distrust of democratic reformation. It is all the same to them whether party character references were actually approved or not. Whether Bartkevich should remain on the buro staff or be removed. And he was retained. So Bartkevich quite successfully passed party certification which was conducted specially by buro members after Smirnov expressed his distrust of some of them.

The reader, most likely, noted how frequent party certifications are in the party organization of the directorate of personnel. And he probably also noticed the value of some of them. How the cold hand of indifference and red tape can stifle a useful and well-conceived plan.

These facts alone gave Smirnov justification, as they say, to sound an alarm: he says that everything is not all right in our party house. He says let us finally examine how we got into this kind of life. But, it turns out, that Smirnov is not right, that the party organization is not suffering from impotence and impersonality and that it does not stand on positions that are old, habitual and convenient for individual communists.

What is this, moral ignorance or impregnable confidence: how is it possible to do that which others are prohibited from doing? They try in words to see to it that the order of the commander of district forces be implemented to rid subunits and units of drunkards, but they themselves actually hide those who drink in their own collective and give them brilliant character references. They require that subordinate personnel organs and commanders take the voice of the party organization into account when decisions are being made on officer promotions in the service, but they themselves act differently.

No, Smirnov's pain was not accidental. Those thoughts with which he arrived at the meeting were not accidental. For example, about the passivity of communists and its causes.

"The fact that there are such serious shortcomings in our party organization is our very own fault," he said. "A passive position is held, I am firmly convinced, in two

instances. First, when you do not feel sufficiently confident and strong because of personal shortcomings in work and serious omissions. Second, if you live according to the principle 'silence is golden, perhaps something will turn up.'"

In essence, the talk was about mediocrity as a manifestation of service passivity that is incompatible with restructuring and acceleration. A mediocrity that gives rise to errors. But they did not hear Smirnov on this point either. Very likely because he did not stop to enumerate the facts, and named only one when an officer was illegally promoted to the next military rank as a result of documents that were incorrectly submitted by regular soldiers. Therefore, during the party investigation, discussion was limited to this one case. They say that it is all true and that the criticism is just, but that this occurred because of a technical error, that the cited case was looked into with communists of the department who were negligent and that the order has been cancelled. . .

But is it possible that the communists of the directorate did not know about many of their other inadequate jobs and errors? They are talked about at virtually every party meeting. Specific cases are looked into, and specific culprits are named. But Smirnov proposed looking into the sources of the shortcomings. Otherwise they will be talking about them from month to month, about newer and newer cases, and nothing will be corrected. The reader already knows what came of this.

There are meetings and meetings. In this party organization as well. Current tasks are discussed at one, and after some time it is forgotten. But the one at which Smirnov talked is remembered to this day. To this day it is timely. Smirnov is no longer in the personnel directorate, but it seems as if he had been talking about today. Because many of the problems that he raised remain to the present time.

Not so long ago, for example, almost the entire personnel directorate was forced to stop its current work in order to prepare an answer to this question: how many officers have been serving in the district 10 or more years, and who are they? Colonel Kholodnyy was right when he evaluated this "event" as follows:

"We are speaking of social justice, but we do not even know to whom to apply it, and who to transfer to an internal district. So that it does not happen that an officer starts his service in desert sands and ends it in desert sands."

We will be more specific: of course, the decision on an officer transfer is the right of a commander. But the personnel directorate should know the personnel situation of forces in the district, and it should be able to influence it and to shape it properly.

It is true that in another case officers of the personnel directorate proved to be more prompt and that they demonstrated an exceptional operational ability. When after a telephone call from the Odessa MD they prepared a document to send Lt Col A. Komlik there after just arriving from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. His entire service is divided into two segments: at first, with Odessa MD forces, without a break, and then in the GSFG. He had not served in other countries. Therefore, they sent him from the GSFG to the "sands of Turkestan." But could Odessa really do without him? It seems that he was an indispensable person. And Tashkent, readily responding to a telephone call, also shared the opinion: indispensable.

Justice was restored by a higher personnel organization. There it was decided: no matter, you in the Odessa Military District somehow squeeze through and try to extricate yourselves, while strengthening combat readiness without Komlik.

Is it not true that the picture is somewhat familiar? The author of these lines had to serve 11 years in the Transbaykal, so that he knows about this not only from official trips: be what may, but implementation of the principle of social justice in deciding the place of service of officers is a sore point.

Therefore, glasnost and democratization in the resolution of personnel questions is the only thing that can break the back of the principle of "I do as I please."

Glasnost is growing more and more in the Turkestan MD. It is not a fancy but a firm and undeviating line. A line whose conduct works for restructuring in units and which reflects the essence of achieved changes. There is less and less secrecy in personnel questions, and these are brought up in officer discussions and party collectives. Lt Gen G. Stefanovskiy, a member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the district, explained it in detail, providing many examples. A party meeting in 'N' unit, let us say, lasted 2 days, during which communists of the directorate were not afraid to give a proper and principled character reference to one of the communist managers.

People are growing up. They are learning democracy. And each move of communists of the personnel directorate must be that much more responsible against the background of all of the visible changes in the district.

Maj Gen V. Kuz, chief of the political department of the district, said simply:

"Smirnov was right, essentially right. The fact that in some way he was overcome with emotion and that he introduced a subjective point of view in his report is also true. But this is not the main thing. The main thing is that he spoke openly and in a party way."

Yes, the party organization of the personnel directorate understood Smirnov fully. It needed the principled involvement of the political department and a member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the district to put everything in its place. And this is a serious lesson for the communists of the personnel directorate.

Therefore, let us look at what happened as an episode in the large-scale picture of our growth and as an example that asserts: indeed, restructuring is not coming easily and its fighters and devotees do not always immediately come out as victors. This is a fact of life and the dialectic of a forward movement. However, the power is with those who, like Smirnov, are not afraid to go against the current.

I am talking with Smirnov. There is not a note of dejection or regret in his voice about what happened. To the contrary, he is speaking cheerfully and with optimism.

"And nonetheless, I am right," he concludes the conversation, as if hammering in the last nail.

And I started to think: what does restructuring sometimes start with in some other collective? Perhaps with the courage of such as Smirnov. Someone must one day stand up and tell the truth to one's face.

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9746

**Responsibility for Train Wreck in GDR Caused
by Kazakh Tanker Assessed**

18010303 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Feb 88 p 2

[Article by Col G. Miranovich: "Why It Happened."
Passages in italics as published]

[Text] *It happened, as has already been reported, on 19 January in a sector of the Leipzig - Berlin main rail line. In the path of a fast train moving along the Leipzig - Berlin - Stralsund route was a tank from one of the units of Group of Soviet Forces Germany. As a result of the crash 6 people were killed and more than 30 were wounded.*

How could it happen that a tank appeared on the train tracks?

Lt Col V. Korzhakov, tank training regiment commander, had already once taken part in eliminating the consequences of an accident on the railroad. In spring of last year in this same section of the route, a freight train wrecked. And it happened that among the first to come to the aid of their German friends were people from his regiment. Largely due to their selflessness the line was returned to operation very quickly.

How many good words the tankers heard about themselves then! And could he, their commander, think that sometime it would be otherwise...?

Lt Col Korzhakov could believe for once and for all what had happened on the line this time—that a train had collided with a tank, his tank!—only at the place of the disaster, when, as he was saving people and freeing the path of damaged cars, unexpectedly he caught the glance of a woman just freed from under the wreckage.

Perhaps the woman was looking for one of her friends or relatives, and he merely met her eyes... Perhaps...

Later, following the disaster, Korzhakov would still have to endure a great deal. But, that instant will remain his main hurt. The instant when he, a Communist, officer and commander, understood at once both the depth of the grief caused the people, and the gravity of his own guilt.

Investigation of the circumstances of the disaster on the Leipzig - Berlin rail sector is still continuing. However, even that which is on the surface forces one to think about many things.

Thus, why did a tank end up on the train tracks?

At 1700 hours 19 January local time, the tank training company commanded by Maj V. Shamshur arrived at the tank training area as per the training schedule. At one of the training sites (on the diagram of the tank training

area it is designated Number 4) the future tank driver-mechanics were to learn to observe through the night vision device while on the move. In practice this worked as follows. Under the observation of Private A. Petukhov, an instructor-mechanic, each student was to make a small circle around the tank training area. Sr Lt A. Shchavel'ev, the platoon commander, was in charge of the exercise in this, the main training area.

After the squad had received a brief period of instruction, Private Zh. Okhapov was first to sit behind the levers of the tank. In literally a few dozen meters from the starting line he was to turn to the right. There stood a marker, a black arrow against a background of a white circle. However, Okhapov did not turn, and did not react either to the marker, or to the command of the instructor-mechanic, transmitted via the tank conversation device. Nor did he react to the command to stop, repeated several times, which was even heard at the starting point.

Further, according to the statement of Private Petukhov, events developed as follows. Seeing that the tank was approaching the railroad, he attempted to turn on the emergency engine stopping mechanism. For some reason the mechanism did not function. Then Petukhov jumped out of the turret, climbed down to the driver-mechanic's hatch and attempted to blind the driver by pulling the upper prism of the night vision device. Even this did not help. The tank continued to move straight ahead. Having climbed the embankment to the rail bed, it stopped. The engine died. Only now, having heard a knocking on the armor, did Private Okhapov open the hatch cover. Having grabbed the numb student by the shoulders, Petukhov lifted him up. He still hoped to start the engine and clear the tracks. But it was already too late. He succeeded only in pulling Okhapov from the hatch, and they together rolled down to the ground.

Consequently, did not the accident originate at the tank training field? Formally this is so. Now both the regiment and the military training directorate of the group of forces are saying that it is located too close to the railroad. I was at that training field. It is actually located next to the main line. And it is a stone's throw from training site number 4 to the line. The start line from where the tank driven by Private Okhapov started and the rail bed are a straight line distance of 269 meters apart. This is reality. And this must be taken into account in the organization of classes and exercises. It is necessary to remember that this proximity does not allow the slightest discrepancy or the slightest slackness. It is necessary to remember that special attention to the observance of safety measures is required of those who organize and lead military training, given this proximity. Such proximity in general presumes maximum organization and particular responsibility in everything that concerns handling weapons and equipment.

And did, say, Sr Lt Shchavel'ev exercise the responsibility and care required in such cases?

That is a difficult question, and this is why. Let us call to mind again the chronicle of the class. Private Okhapov was first to sit behind the controls of the tank. After the disaster, in response to questioning by the investigator on a very important matter he would say: "I am guilty for the fact that I drove in the tank to the railroad tracks, but it occurred because I was poorly trained for tank driving, and my ability to handle the night vision device was poor."

This is not slander. This is also confirmed by the assessments received by Okhapov in the previous classes, and by his service record, signed by Sr Lt Shchavelev. And here this soldier, who was poorly prepared to drive the tank, at the will of this same Shchavelev found himself seated first behind the controls of the tank. Here one could do little more than exclaim: "Where is the logic here, comrade commander?" By the way, it is not only a matter of logic, but also concerns the holy of holies for an officer—accomplishment of his duties, and the requirements of the guidance documents on military training.

For the sake of fairness it must be said that such carelessness was not previously observed in Sr Lt Shchavelev. When and why did he begin to lose his keen perception of his shortcomings, and be reconciled to them? Perhaps it was after no attention was paid to two of his reports on the need to transfer Private Okhapov to a position not associated with driving combat vehicles. Or after he learned that, despite all his persistence, the regiment commander had not succeeded in gaining permission of higher headquarters to build a new tank training area in another, safer place.

This question also arises. Why can the platoon commander have an acute sense of responsibility, say, for the observance of safety measures at this ill-fated lesson, if in the instruction the company commander, being the class leader, did not even remember them. And he was required to do this. "I do not know precisely the boundaries of this tank training area, since I did not take an interest in this, and did not see the documents that delineate its boundaries," states Sr Lt Shchavelev at the inquiry. Is this not eloquent testimony of serious indulgences in the organization of the training process? But this is not the only thing. Yes, Sr Lt Shchavelev was only one of those from whom I heard during my time in the unit: "This awful accident would not have happened, had they listened to our suggestions and requests at higher headquarters." What are they talking about?

They are talking about the fact that 6 km from the regiment there is a tank training area that is virtually unused, due to the specific nature of the tasks accomplished by its proprietors, and could be of good use in training the students.

There are also numerous other questions concerning improving the process of training and indoctrination of the future specialists and junior commanders that today

trouble all the officers of the training regiment. Naturally, they require attentive examination in the appropriate services and directorates. But, the existence of unsolved problems in no way diminishes the responsibility of those who are directly or indirectly involved in what happened on the railroad. Let this harsh lesson, which again showed to what can lead poor knowledge, deviations from established requirements about the organization of military training, violation of safety measures when using military equipment, and irresponsibility, be the last.

Thinking about the circumstances of the tragedy on the Leipzig - Berlin rail sector, one understands that this is the pain and fault not only of Lt Col Korzhakov, Maj Shamshur, Sr Lt Shchavelev, and the officers of the regiment. It is, frankly, a bitter reproach to many officials in the group of forces. It is our common pain. It is not easy to acknowledge this. But it is very important just the same that everyone who is involved in deciding questions of combat readiness and strengthening discipline comprehend it in its full depth and draw the right conclusions.

In connection with this, I wish to return again to Private Okhapov. First, a brief reference. Okhapov, Zharylgasyn Yelamanovich: born 1969; Kazakh; VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League]; secondary education; civilian specialty—tractor driver; single.

It would seem: Why not a candidate tanker? Yes, a candidate. If it is approached formalistically. That is precisely the way they approached it when they determined the assignment of the draftee in the Uilskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, Aktyubinsk Oblast. Guided solely by his biographical information, they sent him to the tank troops. And to send a draftee to the tank troops means to send him to a training subunit. Without this one will not become a tanker.

However, according to the existing statute, candidates for training subunits in the Ground Forces must speak Russian freely. Okhapov, as is noted in the above mentioned service record, "speaks Russian extremely poorly." One asks: How did he become a candidate tanker? Was it an error by the military commissariat?

However, an error by the military commissariat could be corrected in the group of forces. Here there has long existed a system for selecting candidates to training subunits. However, in this case it also did not work in the best way. Why? For all the same reasons: irresponsibility and formalism in its approach to people. Could Majors A. Azmukhanov and F. Neukrytyy, who selects candidates for the regiment from the newly arrived replacements, not have noticed that Okhapov needed an interpreter, had they spoken even one or two phrases to him? However, apparently, the officers did not have the patience for this. They were not accustomed to working with the soldiers face to face. And it is precisely this

style, when we work at the general and overall level, only with the masses, and do not see the specific individual, that also becomes a source of the catastrophe.

Of course, the commanders are at fault. For example, Sr Lt Shchavalev, before entrusting a tank to Private Okhapov, could have led him along the route on foot, and showed him what to do and how to do it. He could have, but he did not. And he let slip by one more chance to avert the catastrophe.

However, I would also like for the Uilskiy Rayon Military Commissar to think about the price of the blunders that he and his subordinates commit, as a result of their irresponsible attitude toward a matter of state importance. Let the tragedy on the railroad also sound the alarm in other military commissariats. How could such an unprepared candidate have gone into a training subunit? This question cannot help but be raised in each military commissariat as it determines the future military specialty of a draftee. This is all the more so when we are speaking about the selection of youth for service in the forces stationed on the territory of the fraternal countries.

Yes, this tragic incident raised many, very many questions. And they will be resolved. There is no other way. Much is already being done. Training facilities have been uncovered that do not fully meet the established requirements. The emergency engine stopping mechanism in all tanks has been tested in operation. Safety measures when handling equipment and weapons have again been studied with the personnel. Intensive engineer preparation of tank training areas and tactical fields is being carried out for the purpose of eliminating the movement of tanks and other equipment beyond the boundaries of the training facilities. Indoctrination work is being improved.

All of this, undoubtedly, should bring results. But this is not only a matter of properly restricting the tank training areas.

Only the highest level of organization, strict military order and unfailing personal responsibility of each official for the job entrusted to him can be a reliable shield against such instances, and the only guarantee against all accidents. Today the work of commanders, political workers and party organizations is aimed at affirming precisely such an atmosphere in each unit, and every subunit. It must also be stated that some officials have been strictly punished along both military and party lines in connection with the accident on the railroad, and that investigation is continuing with respect to others.

I will not forget for a long time the eyes of Lt Col Korzhakov, which reflected the pain of that tragic night, or forget the bitter feeling of guilt in the words of everyone with whom I spoke. Yes, there is no way to make right people's deaths. But it is doubly difficult to realize that it happened on the hospitable land of one's friends. And it is precisely this that makes me return again and again to the thought about the special responsibility of those who serve on the territory of a fraternal country. What happened on the railroad obligates everyone, from general to soldier, to think again and again, and to understand that he is fulfilling a special, international, duty, and that he is on display not only before his own people. It obligates him to understand, and to draw the necessary conclusions, to prevent any such occurrence in the future, and always to hold high the honor of the Soviet soldier.

Yazov Invited to West Germany

18010345 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 May 88 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed 50-word article entitled: "On the Visit of the USSR Minister of Defense."]

[Text] At the invitation of the party and state leadership of the GDR and member of the Politburo of the CC of the SUPG, GDR Minister of National Defense, General of the Army C. Kessler, candidate member of the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU, the USSR Minister of Defense, General of the Army D.T. Yazov, will be in the German Democratic Republic on an official, fraternal visit during the first half of May of this year.

UD/335

Arkhipov, Popov, Sorokin Promoted

18010350 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Feb 88 p 1

[100-word "Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet: On the Awarding of Military Rank.

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Decrees: the award of the military rank of: General of the Army: to Colonel General Arkhipov, Vladimir Mikhaylovich; and to Colonel General Popov, Nikolay Ivanovich; and Admiral of the Fleet to Admiral Sorokin, Aleksey Ivanovich.

[Signed] The Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, A. Gromyko. The Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, T. Menteshashvili. Moscow. The Kremlin. 16 February 1988.

UD/335

General Gareyev Attacks Pacifism, Calls for 'Benevolent' Glasnost

18010319 Moscow OKTYABR in Russian
No 2, Feb 88 pp 175-183

[Article by Col Gen M. Gareyev under rubric "Social and Political Journalism and Feature Articles" commemorates 70th anniversary of Soviet Army: "Great October and Defense of the Motherland"]

[Text] The Soviet Armed Forces have been defending the achievements of the Great October Socialist Revolution for 70 years. Looking back on the road that has been travelled, we once again are also trying to understand, from today's perspective, Lenin's behests on the defense of the Motherland, the lessons of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War, and contemporary experience in the organizational development and training of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Peace without war and weapons has always been a socialist ideal. As far back as the period of the first world war, the Bolshevik party called for an end to imperialistic wars and the conclusion of a just democratic peace. A Decree on Peace was adopted the second day after the October victory which outlined the main direction of the foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government for all of the succeeding years.

The first peace was concluded in the dramatic months of the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918. V. I. Lenin and key personnel of the leadership of our party opposed the Trotskyite slogan about "exporting the revolution," and, despite very difficult conditions, came out in support of peace. They proceeded from the fact that the preservation and strengthening of Soviet power was the most effective form of international assistance to the international proletariat. It was then that the principles of the Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries were established, which the Soviet Union has consistently adhered to all these years.

The attitude toward an armed defense of the achievements of the revolution was determined on the basis of a Leninist peace-loving policy.

As is known, the classics of Marxism-Leninism initially considered it necessary to wreck the bourgeois state machine, including such of its attributes as the army and the police. They were convinced that the national police would become an armed safeguard of the revolution.

However, the conditions under which the Armed Forces of our country were created after the victory of the October revolution were significantly different from those that existed at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. The main feature was that the socialist revolution, as was indeed foreseen by V. I. Lenin, was victorious in only one country, which found itself in a hostile capitalist encirclement in the very first days of its existence. The imperialist states imposed an intervention and a civil war on us, and the need for another approach to the organization of the defense of the achievements of socialism.

Military affairs became significantly complicated after the first world war. Under these conditions, the scanty and poorly trained and armed volunteer units and police formations were in no condition to oppose the superior and well-organized forces of the numerous enemies of the revolution.

Taking the existing situation into consideration, the party came to the conclusion that there was only one way to defend Soviet rule in the prevailing state of emergency—the creation of a regular, massive and well-organized and trained army. Such an army could not be built on a volunteer principle; it was necessary to switch to compulsory military service for the male population

and to introduce universal military training of the workers and peasants. This was a principally new resolution of the question on the organization of the Armed Forces of the socialist state.

The 8th Congress RKP, [Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] approved the Leninist policy of military organization and the creation of a class, regular army that was centrally controlled.

The creation of such an army was one of the most important factors leading to the defeat of the campaign of 14 foreign states and the domestic counterrevolution against Soviet rule.

As M. S. Gorbachev noted in his report in honor of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, "The party rallied and mobilized the people in the defense of the socialist Motherland and the gains of October. Hungry, ragged and barefoot, the poorly armed Red soldiers routed a well-trained and equipped counterrevolutionary army which was well fed by the imperialist West and East."

Our military doctrine even then had a defensive character in a political context, inasmuch as the Red Army had never attacked anyone, but was forced to defend the gains of the revolution. At the 13th Congress of the party, M. V. Frunze said: "I consider it a very harmful, foolish and childish venture to talk now about offensive wars on our part."

V. I. Lenin considered that the management of the Armed Forces and all matters of strengthening the defensive capability of the country was the highest socio-political principle of military organizational development.

The party paid a lot of attention to the development and practical implementation of the principles of the unity of the army and the people and the friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism, which was one of the most important sources of the internal solidarity and combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces. Addressing representatives of various nations and soldier-internationalists, V. I. Lenin said: "A great honor has fallen to you to defend sacred ideas with weapons in hands and . . . to make the international brotherhood of peoples a reality."

In contrast to bourgeois parties and states, which hypocritically mask the anti-popular essence of imperialist armies, our party and the Soviet government from the very beginning openly proclaimed the principle of a class approach to the organizational development of the Armed Forces and those called to defend the interests of the workers. At the same time the party examined the class approach to the acquisition of manpower for the army as a temporary phenomenon, bearing in mind that,

after the elimination of the exploiting classes and the victory of socialism, it would be transformed into a army of the whole people, which subsequently did occur.

The most important principles of Soviet military organizational development are centralism, one-man command and iron discipline which are the indispensable conditions of the combat capability of the Armed Forces, and without which the army and the navy cannot perform as a united and organized force.

V. I. Lenin raised the question of centralism and one-man command on principle and without any reservations. "Irresponsibility," he said, "that is concealed by references to collective leadership is a very dangerous evil that threatens all those who do not have very much experience in the matter of collective leadership work and which in military affairs quite often leads inevitably to catastrophe, chaos, panic, multiple authority and defeat."

He considered the introduction of the institution of military commissariats in the period of the civil war to be a temporary and compulsory measure under prevailing extraordinary historical conditions, when there was an insufficient number of command cadres that were ideologically hardened and dedicated to the revolution, and it became necessary to attract military specialists of the old army, when hostile elements could penetrate the Red Army. The changes carried out in the Red Army in the years 1924-1925, the reinforcement of organs of military control with experienced party cadres and ridding them of Trotskyites created the conditions for the introduction of one-man command into the army and navy.

The rejection of one-man command and the return to the institution of military commissars in the 1930's and in 1941, as historical experience has shown, was not sufficiently justified. The harsh reality of war made it necessary in each case to reinstitute one-man command, which we always implemented on a party basis.

The Leninist conception of one-man command as the only correct organization of work and as the most expedient method of command and control of troops remains unshakable under current conditions as well.

Attaching great importance to centralism and one-man command in the Soviet Armed Forces, much attention was paid from the very beginning of their creation to training personnel in the spirit of conscientious military discipline and to the development of democratic principles.

The elements of democratism were strong in our Armed Forces at all times, but for a number of different reasons they were not always properly displayed and utilized in full measure. During the period of the civil war, and at times in the 1920's and 1930's as well, this resulted in a

misunderstanding of the necessity for unquestioned obedience to the orders of commanders, and this had to be decisively corrected after the Finno-Soviet war of 1939-1940. In turn, one-man commanders were not always able to be guided by party and Komsomol organizations and to activate and fully utilize the creativity and initiative of personnel.

Under current conditions, when restructuring is being implemented in the country and in the Armed Forces, there is a need, along with a further strengthening of one-man command, for activation and utilization of the human factor in every way possible. In this connection, greater democratization of the methods of work of military councils, party and Komsomol organizations, officer assemblies, sports committees, women's councils and other social organizations also becomes a task of restructuring.

After the end of the civil war, in 1921, the central committee of our party sent a letter to all party organizations which said: "The party has decided. . . that the army must be retained and that its combat capability must be raised. . . We will commit a terrible crime against the revolution if we forget this." It was planned at that time to introduce the kind of military organization that would take into full account both the danger of imperialist aggression and the internal capabilities of the Soviet state.

The 10th Congress of the party rejected the aims of Trotsky and his supporters to convert the Armed Forces immediately into a militia system, recognizing them to be incorrect and extremely dangerous under conditions of a complicated international situation and the unceasing efforts of imperialism to suffocate the young Soviet republic.

During the years 1924-1924, by a decision of the CC of the party and the Soviet government, major changes were made in the Armed Forces in order to increase their combat capability. On instructions of the party, M. V. Frunze directly managed their implementation.

The organizational development of the Red Army moved along two lines: first, along the line of improving the organizational structure and increasing the combat readiness of cadres of large units (*soyedineniye*) and units (*chast*); and, secondly, along the line of developing and introducing a territorial militia system.

By 1925 the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces was reduced from 5.5 million persons to 562,000 persons. However, while in an organizational sense the Red Army was no longer inferior to the largest armies of the capitalist countries, it still remained very small numerically and especially weak in a technical sense.

Persistent work in improving the organizational development of the Armed Forces was continued in the succeeding years also. The growing threat of war

demanding urgent measures in further increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, and first and foremost, increasing their technical level of equipment. History posed this question in a very stark way: we had to overcome the economic and technical backwardness of the country and strengthen defenses, or we would not be able to preserve the freedom and independence of the Soviet republic. This task was essentially solved through the heroic efforts of the party and the Soviet people. The Soviet Union was vitally interested in maintaining small armed forces, but the intensified preparation for a second world war by Germany and other capitalist states compelled us gradually to increase their strength.

As the Great Patriotic War subsequently demonstrated, with respect to a majority of the main and most fundamental questions, the basic direction of the organizational development of our Armed Forces was established correctly and was implemented with due regard for the nature of the forthcoming war. Of decisive importance was the farsighted and scientifically based approach to such problems as the mobilization of all forces of the state to strengthen the defense of the country, the creation of a large-scale regular army, the rational combination and proportional development of all types of Armed Forces and combat arms, the relationship of man and technology in war, and others. However, up to the beginning of the war, not everything that had been planned was fully completed, especially with regard to the mass production of new tanks, aircraft and other types of weapons.

In conjunction with this, it would be incorrect to assert that all of the propositions of our theory and practice were faultless and comprehensively developed prior to the war. Many writings devoted to the history of the Great Patriotic War state that on the eve of the war Soviet military theory did not take into account the possibility of a surprise invasion by major enemy forces, that it did not adequately develop the forms and methods of conducting a strategic defense, and that questions of defense on a strategic-operational scale were very poorly developed in a practical way. However, one of the most complicated tasks that the Soviet Supreme High Command had to accomplish in the very first days of the war was the organization and conduct of strategic defense.

Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov wrote regarding this question: "In reworking operational plans during the spring of 1941 the particular features of conducting a modern war in its initial period were not fully considered in practice. The people's commissar of defense and the general staff believed that war between such major powers as Germany and the Soviet Union should start in accordance with an earlier existing pattern: the main forces enter into battle several days after border engagements. With respect to periods of concentration and deployment, fascist Germany was positioned under conditions similar to ours. Actually, both the forces and the conditions were far from equal."

These conditions on the eve of the war required the adoption of a series of urgent measures for the early concealed deployment of armed forces and their preparation to repulse aggression. In the first half of 1941, the people's commissar of defense and the general staff twice approached I. V. Stalin with a proposal on these questions, but they were not adopted, as was said at that time, because of "higher political considerations." Stalin still hoped in that period that war could be avoided.

A fatal role was also played by a TASS report of 14 June 1941 which officially refuted "rumors" about the possibility of a fascist Germany attack on the Soviet Union, and it expressed confidence that Germany would continue to abide by the non-aggression pact.

After the war it was explained that this was a political probe for the purpose of finding out how the leadership of Hitlerite Germany would react to the report. If this action is examined abstractly, only from the point of view of political considerations, it would appear to be an ordinary matter. Why not explore the existing situation once more? But in this case the fact was not taken into account that any official announcement in our press would be perceived as a directed line of the political leadership, but no other instructions in this regard were given to command elements of districts and fleets.

A lot could have been done on the initiative of commanders of district and fleet forces. But baseless repressions in the 1930's eliminated the most experienced and capable commanders and political workers from the army, and inadequately prepared young cadres took their place. In addition, they were intimidated and hamstrung and were afraid to undertake any kind of important measures without the approval of higher authority.

It is impossible to judge the failures of 1941 in isolation from all of this. The harsh lessons of the past attest to the fact that an abstract policy does not and cannot exist in a pure form. Policy, also including foreign policy, can be vital only when it takes all conditions of the situation into complete account: international, economic, ideological, and not least of all, the interests of resolving defense tasks.

An important fact was overlooked at a certain moment on the eve of the war, that in the event of the initiation of military operations it was not possible to proceed in a military and in a political sense only on the basis of personal desires and convictions, not taking into account the fact that an enemy will strive to do everything when and whether it is convenient and advantageous for him.

Everyone understands that it was important for the Soviet Union at that time to gain time, to win at least a year or two to ready the state for defense. But the fascist bosses also unquestionably understood that within a year or two, even by their own risky calculations, the chances

of success would be significantly less. Therefore, they relied mainly on a surprise attack and on the use of those temporary advantages that were available to them.

In practice, all of this led to the fact that at the time fascist Germany attacked the USSR our first echelon divisions were located at their permanent garrisons, and only at the initiation of hostilities did they begin to move out to the state border to meet the enemy's attacking tank groupings. What all of this led to is well-known.

And in this extremely difficult situation, which was conditioned by objective and subjective causes, the entire course and outcome of the war was predetermined by the advantages of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the socialist social and state system. Underlying these decisive factors, which ensured our victory, was the profound faith of a majority of the Soviet people in the correctness of the idea of the October revolution, because as a result of the socialist transformation of our society in practice they were convinced that Soviet rule was actually their rule, which reflected the vital interests of the workers.

If one recalls the full gravity of the oppression and poverty of a majority of the people of czarist Russia, then it is not difficult to understand how the simple Soviet citizen valued the elimination of man's exploitation by man, unemployment and a guaranteed right to work, the acquisition by peasants of land from Soviet authority, real assurance of the equal rights of nations, wide access of the popular masses to culture, free health care, education, and much else.

No distortions of the principles of socialism and justice could cancel all of these revolutionary gains. And therefore the people and their Armed Forces under the leadership of the Communist Party indeed fought selflessly for the honor and independence of their native land, and in behalf of the defense of the cause of the October revolution.

And in the years 1941 and 1942, despite all adversities, and at times in desperate moments, it was the steadfastness of our soldiers, commanders and political workers, and their belief in the justice of our cause, that made it possible to withstand and to stop the enemy offensive. But after the battles at Moscow and Stalingrad we were fighting in an entirely different way. The country had increased the production of tanks and weapons, and the command cadres and all personnel, having gone through severe combat hardening, began to surpass the enemy more and more in the level of military art and combat skill.

As always in a difficult time, the people and the army brought forth such talented military leaders as G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevskiy, I. S. Konev, K. K. Rokossovskiy, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, I. D. Chernyakhovskiy, and many others who through their courage and military creativeness brought glory to our Motherland and to the Soviet Armed Forces.

Supreme High Commander I. V. Stalin, who did much for victory through his purposefulness, will, and ability to discipline the people, began to understand more and more that military affairs also have their own special conformity to natural laws, that not everything here is superficial and that, as V. I. Lenin bequeathed, they have to be studied properly.

Approximately in the middle of the war, Headquarters Supreme High Command developed an efficient system of decision-making in the conduct of the most important operations with the active participation of the general staff and the commanders of combat arms, fronts and fleets. This facilitated making a sober estimate of the enemy and the capabilities of our own troops and arriving at the most expedient decisions and methods of conducting operations, taking into account the specific conditions of a situation, which ensured the outstanding victories at Kursk in 1943, the execution of a number of brilliant operations in 1944, and the Vistula-Oder, Berlin and Manchurian operations in 1945.

During the course of the war, the Soviet Army conducted dozens of different operations and all of them differed in the novelty of the methods of operations that were employed, which the enemy did not expect. The development of flexible forms of preparation for and the conduct of defensive operations with a subsequent shift to a counteroffensive, the theory of strategic offensive operations, the resolution of problems of the operational and strategic breakthrough of enemy defenses with a subsequent encirclement, new methods of combat employment and coordination of the different services of the Armed Forces and combat arms, such an effective form of fire engagement of enemy targets as artillery and air offensives, new forms and methods of building order of battle, all-round support of operations and firm command and control of troops—these and many other questions that were resolved in a new way during the war retain their value under modern conditions to a certain degree.

As a result of the defeat of fascism and victory in the second world war, in which the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces played a decisive role, the entire international situation changed radically. Instead of one socialist country, a whole community of socialist countries appeared. The colonial system collapsed, and many people received their freedom and proceeded on a path of independent development. The economic might and international authority of the Soviet Union grew.

But all of this did not suit imperialist circles. Therefore, at the very end of the war, without any military necessity and with far-reaching political objectives, atomic bombs were dropped on peaceful Japanese cities, and immediately after the war the "cold war" was unleashed.

With more and more new facts, historical experience and contemporary life confirm the Leninist proposition that "politically, imperialism in general strives for violence and reaction."

The new version of the CPSU Program emphasizes that "imperialism is the perpetrator of two world wars that took tens of millions of lives. It creates the threat of a third world war." At a meeting of representatives of the party and movements in November of 1987, Gus Hall and other leaders of the Communist Party definitively confirmed this conclusion. A certain transformation of capitalism has occurred under the current conditions, and the leaders of capitalist countries cannot but consider the realities of the nuclear age. Taking all of this into account, imperialism can maneuver and adapt itself to the new conditions. But in its very nature, it cannot make peace and the security of peoples the ultimate objective of its policy.

The destruction of the world system of socialism and affirmation of U.S. hegemony are declared to be the main objective of contemporary U.S. military doctrine. It was proclaimed as far back as 1945 in Truman's message to congress when he asserted that victory in the second world war confronted the American people with the continuous and vitally necessary leadership of the world. This statement was reaffirmed by all presidents in various forms in subsequent years. Imperialism has always striven and will continue to strive to take social revenge, to change the existing relationship of forces and events unfavorable to it, and to press, and in the final analysis, as Reagan declared, also to eliminate socialism as a social system.

All of these reasons and objective factors are capable of stirring up the danger of the emergence of war or military conflicts, which could at any time take a very unexpected turn that closely impinges on the interests of the USSR and other socialist countries. However, there is no fatal inevitability of war under current conditions. The CPSU Program comes to the definite conclusion that it is possible to prevent war and to save humanity from catastrophe.

The fact that a modern nuclear missile war cannot be won also has been acknowledged more than once by U.S. leaders. Then what are the imperialist circles of the U.S. and other NATO countries counting on in following an aggressive policy and course in preparing for war? They are trying by means of the arms race to stimulate their own economy and to undermine the economy of the USSR and other socialist countries, to scrap strategic military parity, to attain decisive military and technical superiority, to bring pressure on other countries and to dictate their will. Plans are being nurtured for achieving the political objectives of war with the employment only of conventional means of destruction.

In its military preparations, the Pentagon has not yet completely abandoned the illusion of the possibility of achieving victory in a nuclear war. Up until now U.S. military doctrine has been based on the delivery of a preemptive nuclear strike. Thus, Presidential Directive No 59 of 1980 formulated the U.S. objective very

specifically: the destruction of socialism as a socio-political system, first use of nuclear weapons, achievement of superiority over the USSR in a nuclear war and its conclusion on terms favorable to the U.S. The "strategic defense initiative of the U.S." was called upon to serve the attainment of this objective. Announced by the U.S. president on 23 March 1983, it was intended not only to create a large-scale antimissile defense with elements of space basing, ensuring, according to Pentagon calculations, delivery of a first nuclear strike with impunity, but also the placement of space strike weapons in orbit that were capable of destroying targets on Earth. Convinced that they could not achieve decisive superiority by improving strategic offensive forces, the politico-military leadership of the U.S. decided to shift the arms race into space.

Also, it is not accidental that attempts were made recently to prove that after the sides exchanged nuclear strikes a "nuclear winter" need not necessarily follow. Some American "investigators" said in that respect that the employment of air bursts and neutron munitions would reduce the negative effects of nuclear weapons use. In the same way, an effort is being made to show that a nuclear war can be won under certain conditions. Practical preparation for such a war is proceeding in all directions, and military preparations are increasing.

And all of these military preparations are being implemented each time under the cover of deceitful demagogic cries about the "Soviet military threat." Back in 1919, V. I. Lenin talked about those foolish people who believe in the "Red" danger and cry about "Red militarism." "These are," he emphasized, "political frauds who give the impression that they believe this nonsense."

As has already been noted, after the civil war the Soviet republic reduced the Red Army by 10 times, and in the years 1924-1925 it had relatively the smallest army in the world (in the number of servicemen per 1 million population). But they also cried then about "Red" militarism. In the 1930's, Western countries fussed endlessly about the threat on the part of the Soviet Union, and under this pretext they armed and prepared fascist aggression against our country. And in the postwar years, each spiral of the arms race was accompanied and is accompanied in our day by the hysterical howlings about the excessively armed countries of the Warsaw Pact, although it is known that the U.S. and not the Soviet Union is the initiator of the arms race.

If this is so (and it is impossible to refute these obvious and well-known facts), then why are all of these myths about the "Soviet military threat" necessary? John Dulles, one of the inspirers of the "cold war," answered this with great clarity: "In order to compel the country to assume the burden which the support of powerful armed forces requires, it is necessary to create an emotional

atmosphere bordering on military hysteria. It is necessary to evoke the fear of danger from without." Consequently, the "secret" consists of the fact that political justification is necessary to a continuously developing arms race, and therefore the military-industrial magnates require an intensification of an aggressive policy and the continuous application of threats and ventures fraught with the potential for turning into war.

All of this, of course, can in no way be tied to new thinking about questions of war and peace. In contrast to the aggressive policy of the imperialist states, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are conducting a consistently peace-loving policy. Soviet military doctrine believes that no matter how great the threat to peace is under the existing conditions created by the policy of aggressive imperialist circles, it is possible to prevent war. Socialist countries are confirmed enemies of war in any form. It is impossible in the nuclear space age to ensure the security of an individual state or of a group of states by military and technological means alone. Political means and actions take on an ever increasing significance in ensuring security.

A meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member countries in Berlin in May 1987 very sharply posed the question that a historical moment has arrived when it is necessary to reject the concept of "nuclear deterrence," according to which nuclear weapons are a guarantee of a state's security. The socialist countries propose to the NATO states that, on a mutual basis, they reject the use of military force and that they assume the obligation of supporting peaceful relations between them. Hence, the doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states is declared. The proposals of the USSR and other socialist states have been reaffirmed, and they are directed at the complete elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, a reduction in arms, a radical reduction in strategic offensive armed forces and conventional weapons of the USSR and the U.S. with a simultaneous strengthening of the regime of the ABM Treaty, a rejection of placing weapons in space, a ban on chemical weapons and nuclear testing, the disbandment of military blocs, the elimination of foreign bases, and the redeployment of troops from foreign bases to locations within national borders.

A meeting of M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and R. Reagan, President of the U.S., the persistent efforts of the Soviet leadership, and the realistic position of U.S. leaders, have already brought the first positive results, which have great historical significance. The achievement of an agreement on the elimination of medium and lesser range missiles has in a practical way made a beginning in the building of peace without nuclear weapons. Significant progress has been made on the problem of radical reduction of strategic offensive forces under the terms of adherence to the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union is fully resolved under mutual agreement also consistently to put all other proposals on weapons reduction into practice.

However, under conditions when a real military threat posed by the imperialists is not decreasing, the USSR and other Warsaw Pact member states are forced to strengthen their defense capabilities and increase the combat readiness of the armed forces in order to ensure reliable protection of the gains of socialism.

The new version of the CPSU Program states: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union considers the defense of the socialist Motherland, the strengthening of the defense of the country and guaranteeing state security as one of the most important functions of the Soviet state." As required by the USSR Constitution and party regulations, every communist, every Soviet person, is obliged to do everything in his power to support the defense capabilities at an appropriate level.

The main content and direction of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states is in complete accord with the objective of the peace-loving policy of the countries of the socialist community and the interests of ensuring their security: not to permit a nuclear war, to make themselves secure and to defend their countries against the encroachments of imperialism, and to provide the people with an opportunity to work under peaceful conditions. All of their measures in the military sphere are permeated exclusively with the interests of resolving this principal defense task. The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states has a purely defensive direction, to the effect that defensive measures and military organization in the allied countries are conducted within the context of military balance and necessary sufficiency and are intended exclusively for retaliatory actions and defense against possible aggression.

It was once again asserted at the aforementioned meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states that they would under no circumstances initiate war—neither nuclear nor conventional—against any state, be it in Europe or any other area of the world, if they themselves do not become the target of an attack. The countries of the socialist community declare that they have no territorial claims on any state in Europe or outside of Europe. They do not treat any state or people as their enemy. The attainment of the lowest level of military confrontation would meet the interests of the Warsaw Pact member states. The maintenance of a military balance at the lowest possible level is a very important condition for ensuring security and peace. Genuine equal security in our century is guaranteed not by high but by very low levels of strategic balance. Continuation of the nuclear arms race can lead to the fact that parity (balance) will stop being a factor in military-political deterrence.

But inasmuch as the level of these limits is constrained by the military preparations of the imperialist states, then the defensive power of the socialist countries must be built taking into account that in relation to the USSR and the U.S. and the WP and NATO it should be equal

and identical: their security—mutual, and in an international respect on the whole—universal. "Realizing the scale of the military threat," M. S. Gorbachev points out, "and recognizing our responsibility for the fate of the world, we will not permit a breakdown in the military-strategic balance between the USSR and the U.S. and between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO. We will also adhere to this policy in the future, for we have firmly learned once and for all what the past has taught us."

The defensive character of our military doctrine predetermines the especially high requirements for the combat readiness of our army and navy. Soldiers of the socialist countries must display high vigilance and always be ready to stop the intrigues of imperialism. This is especially important when one considers that there are also quite a few serious shortcomings in the activities of military cadres in maintaining high military readiness, which the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee severely and justly pointed out in connection with the violation of USSR air space by a foreign aircraft at the end of May of last year. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee once more underscored the principal importance of the task of a decisive increase in the level of combat readiness and discipline in the Armed Forces, efficient command and control of forces, and assurance of their constant ability to stop any encroachment on the sovereignty of the Soviet state.

The strength of our Armed Forces lies in their indissoluble unity with the people. One of the most important lessons of the war is that only through the efforts of the entire country and of the leadership of the party can a reliable defense of the socialist Motherland be assured. Of great significance to the further strengthening of the country's defenses is the restructuring which was laid down by the 27th CPSU Congress and which is being implemented in the country, and the profound socio-economic, spiritual and cultural changes that are taking place in our society. The improvement in ideological-political and military-patriotic education, intellectual and physical development, and an increase in the general education and technical level of young people make it possible to achieve an even more profound understanding by soldiers of their patriotic and military obligation and the personal responsibility of each Soviet citizen for the defense of the socialist Motherland. The development of democracy, glasnost and improvement in the moral atmosphere in society suffuse the ideals of socialism, which must be defended, with a more profound meaning. In addition, all of these changes create favorable conditions for a more successful mastery of military specialties and complicated military equipment and weapons in a short time, which contributes to a further increase in the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

One should consider that the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces are occurring today in a complicated international situation. On the one hand, there is a steady struggle for peace and

disarmament, and the idea of preventing war is becoming increasingly more convincing and stronger. On the other hand, the threat of war continues to exist. In such a dynamic and contradictory situation, the organic combination and successful resolution of the two-part task of strengthening peace and the defense capability of the country takes on some new features and becomes a more complicated matter than was the case up to the Great Patriotic War. Under these conditions, all of the work in preparing young people for service in the Armed Forces and military-patriotic education should be significantly more profound, well-reasoned and convincing.

In this connection, it is intolerable when individual articles published in our press express judgments concerning unilateral disarmament. The necessity for defense of the Motherland and the military profession is put into doubt.

The more complex matter of the struggle for the reduction of arms, on which so much selfless work, persistence and energy has been expended by the leadership of our party headed by M. S. Gorbachev, is depicted by some journalists in an overly simple way, and only as the psychological inertia of a race after each other. The matter amounts to such irresponsible statements that some writers, in essence, call on our soldiers not to deliver a retaliatory strike on an enemy, even if he is the first to start a war against us. But this kind of position has nothing in common with genuine interests in the fight for peace. For this not only does not deter, but it even encourages an aggressor to attack. Frequently these writings come from communists who cannot help but know that resolutions adopted by the 27th Congress, party regulations and the USSR Constitution define tasks and duties for all communists and Soviet citizens in strengthening the defense of the country and performing military duty for the Motherland. They propose that the Soviet Union boldly pursue unilateral disarmament and a reduction in the period of military service. But the most remarkable thing is that, as a rule, (and this is the main essence of their position), they do not make any proposals relative to the reduction of weapons of the NATO countries. In one of the articles in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, a well-known writer has no feeling for us, and he literally gloats over the landing of a West German plane in Moscow.

Some are already raising doubts about our victory in the Great Patriotic War, since, they say, there were too many losses, and we did not win battles the way we should have; they propose that we reject the concept of "just" and "unjust" wars, and that there should be no distinction between the aggressor and his victim.

One automatically thinks: but in 1812 the Russian Army had to retreat and even surrender Moscow. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, which brought freedom to the Balkan nations, there was even more confusion. But all of these wars have remained in the memories of the people in a halo of glory, and no one every

tried to raise doubts about the victories of the Russian Army. But here, speaking politely, there is an undertone of hostility to their own Armed Forces, who won such great victories and who did so much for the defense of the freedom and independence of their Motherland. The question arises in this connection: to what purpose is all of this and where does it come from?

Apparently, all of this is explained by three circumstances. First, and this is the main thing—a majority of the errors result from an underestimation of the complexity of the struggle for peace and the military threat that really exists. And in this sphere a unique kind of "avant-gardists" have appeared who, with good intentions, of course, put out what we all desire as fact. Second, this is simply our ill-wishers. We will never change the minds of such people on anything, but apparently it is also not possible to underestimate the damage that they can cause. Moreover, as became known, some leading imperialist states have developed a whole system of measures for weakening the combat capability of the armies of the socialist countries through the dissemination of pacifist ideas. They are carrying out this work rather aggressively, and some naive people take this bait, helping to play into their hands, not comprehending that in the real international situation the struggle for peace and readiness to defend it with weapons in hands do not contradict but complement each other. Otherwise, this will not be a philosophy of peace but a philosophy of capitulation before an aggressor. Third, an overwhelming majority of the personnel of the army and the navy honorably and selflessly perform their duty to the Motherland. However (and we also must acknowledge this with self-criticism), many negative phenomena that have accumulated in society have also penetrated the Armed Forces. The Soviet people have gotten accustomed to seeing in our officers a model of honor, high morality, and selflessness, and any deviation from this standard is met by a protest and just condemnation.

Glasnost has also touched the military environment, and facts are becoming known which heretofore were not always public. Along with objective and correct criticism, they are frequently accompanied by narrow-minded gusto. Extensive glasnost (within the limits of keeping state and military secrets) will bring nothing but benefits, and it should not be feared. But, as we believe, the criticism of shortcomings that exist in the army and the navy should be benevolent and promote the strengthening of their combat capability.

An incident like this comes to mind (the papers have already written about something like this). The matter occurred before the war. One young man from near Mogilev, before entering school, wrote his mother a letter, asking for advice: "Mama, should I enroll in a military school?" The woman, who was poorly educated but who grasped the complexities of our life, replied: "Son, of course, go to the military school—it is not for us to hire foreigners to defend our Motherland." And I

would like to wish that all Soviet people understood the importance of one's military duty as profoundly as does that White Russian woman made wise by life's experience.

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**Early 70's Training Experiment Revived,
Considered for Dissemination**

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[Article by Lieutenant Colonel S. Pashayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Moscow Military District: "Postscript to an Experiment—Perestroyka: How Something New is Introduced;" first four paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Since last year training for cadets in the Moscow Military District Training Division has incorporated a new methodology. The process for introducing this methodology has not been easy and has uncovered a number of problems at both the organizational and psychological level. Have these problems been resolved now that all of the training units and Ground Force major units are transitioning to this new methodology?

People in the division feel that they are almost resolved.

A scientist who was at the source of this experiment disputes this point of view.

Candidate for Psychological Sciences Captain 1st Rank B. Khoziyev contends, "The fact is that the simplified, primitive understanding of the essence of this new methodology is not only limiting its potential capabilities, but is also likely to compromise the very idea of accelerating the training of specialists..."

The initial experiments in the practical application of a theory that had been successfully developed by Professor P. Galperin and a group of coworkers at MGU [Moscow State University] imeni M. V. Lomonosov in the early 50's began in the Armed Forces in 1973. A group of military psychologists from the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin, a group that included officers B. Badmayev, S. Sedin, B. Khoziyev and others, took the initiative at that time.

The initial results of this experimental training exceeded all expectations. For example after only 20 hours of exercises future radio-telegraph operators began to work at the 3rd Class level with the "blind, ten-fingered method." At the same time their coworkers from the control group were still not able to totally master the telegraph keyboard after 28 hours of training using the traditional method. In another unit an evaluation committee graded the level of training for personnel from one subunit that was working on the R-140 radio as

"high" after 60 hours of exercises. The average grade for the platoon was 4.7. The control group which had had 24 more training hours had barely reached the "satisfactory" level. A third example is that a training platoon of experts from the Chemical Forces who had worked with personnel using the non-traditional method had 90 percent of its personnel get excellent marks on their final examination. The control group did not get a single "five" and half of its marks were "three's."

Similar results were obtained with training radar operators for radio-technical forces, Air Force aviation mechanics, academy students during exercises in special disciplines and cadets from two military schools in the study of combined arms regulations.

The data from these and other experiments were reported to the USSR Armed Forces General Staff in summarized form and in accordance with the General Staff's instructions the data were examined at a monthly meeting of methodologists from several branches of the Armed Forces in October 1973. However no decision was made about introducing this new methodology at that time and this eliminated any chance of expanding the scope of the experiments. True, thanks to the enthusiasm of military psychologists and an active group of trained officer-methodologists, local experiments were conducted in the forces for a short time, but they were also soon halted and the group disbanded.

In January 1985 one of the enthusiasts for introduced the new methodology, Candidate for Psychological Sciences Captain 1st Rank Boris Ilich Khoziyev, wrote a letter to the USSR Ministry of Defense. He argued and substantiated the possibility and advisability of using psychological theory to formulate mental activity in a planned fashion while training experts for the Army and Navy.

Citing specific results Khoziyev proved that there would be obvious advantages to introducing that methodology. For example, it was possible to train specialists to at least the 2nd Class level in training units, all in a total of three months. It was also possible to train cadets in several specialties at the same time and make the transition from individual to group training to train crews and teams.

Of course the author understands that perestroyka itself is no simple matter. He therefore specifically linked accelerating the process of introducing scientific approaches into an existing training system for specialists with the accomplishment of several organizational measures such as creating a unique scientific subunit in the appropriate directorates of the Armed Forces branches. These subunits would be involved with the problems of psychological and pedagogical support for military training.

Khoziyev wrote, "I can state that officers who have been involved in military training for units, major units, districts and branches of the Armed Forces do not have any special methodological training. Their abilities are based only on their experiences in their own previous activities. There are no officers with special psychological or pedagogical education or training. By analogy it is difficult to imagine, for example, that the USSR Ministries of Higher, Secondary or Special Education would not have a single candidate or doctor of sciences in pedagogy or psychology in their department of methodology or that people without such qualifications worked there..."

Because of all the different conclusions contained in the letter, people in the USSR Ministry of Defense were very attentive and even constructive in their approach to the it. The official answer stated that "the recommendations... to introduce a methodology for speeding up training is worthy of attention. On the whole, the author of the letter has a correct understanding of the importance of these new methods, the primary shortcomings and the difficulties in introducing and disseminating them into the forces and VUZ's [institutions of higher education]... The Ground Force GUBP (Main Directorate for Military Training—S.P.) has been assigned the task of conducting further research into the methodology for speeding up training and also the task of preparing recommendations for the General Staff on introducing the methodology.

In accordance with the decision that was then made, a temporary group of experts was set up at the Main Directorate for Ground Force Military Training. This group began setting up an experiment in the Moscow Military District training division and Captain 1st Rank Khoziyev was also included in this experiment.

The experiment was conducted in two stages. Between June to October 1985 training and methodological materials and textbooks on training subjects were developed and training for training subunit commanders was set up. During the second phase, from January through April 1986, cadets (two platoons of future rifle squad commanders and two platoons of future tank mechanic-drivers) went through the entire training course using the new methodology. This course included exercises in tactical, firing and technical training, training in regulations, driving, defense against weapons of mass destruction and several special training issues. A fair analysis of the results again confirmed that the methodology had a future.

It was decided to continue the experiment, this time at the divisional level. The results of the summer training period spoke for themselves: 26.3 percent of the graduates who studied using the new methodology passed their examinations at the "outstanding" level and 44.8 percent at the "good" level. And in addition, military discipline noticeably improved in the major unit and the rhythm of the training process became clearer.

However the expanded scale of the experiment also brought a number of serious problems to light and these must be mentioned. There is, for example, the economic side. The conclusions that were presented to the Main Directorate for Ground Force Military Training have the following paragraph: "In addition to the increased quality of training, training with the new methodology also allowed a significant reduction in the material expenditures to train each tank mechanic-driver because of the more effective use of film-trainers (the average driving time per tank for each driver-mechanic in experienced platoons was reduced by 26 percent without any loss—S. P.) During the training period cadet commanders of motorized rifle squads in BMP's expended 40 percent less ammunition than did those in the control groups (the number of shots was reduced by almost 50 percent for similar reasons—S. P.).

But we must also consider that the division had to bring in a large number of officers to make up the training and study charts and tasks. Dozens of officers were brought in for five months to develop UTK (training charts) for tankers and motor riflemen alone! But this is not all, for 460,000 training and study charts were made up at the cost of a tremendous amount of work. You cannot call this being economic or effective, even when when you consider that, as divisional directorate officer G. Zamulenko put it, the people whom "we were able to bring in" got accustomed to developing the charts. It should be no surprise that a significant number of UTK are now being redone. And we will obviously not be able to avoid this in the future if they are not centrally made.

But the main thing is the expense of training the primary instructors who have to introduce the new methodology. It is understandable that they have to totally master this methodology. Unfortunately they are not always able to do this. Even during this training year the author of this article has been able to visit a number of exercises whose primary instructors, to put it bluntly, knew the underlying principles of the new methodology in a very simplified manner.

As is known, when the new methodology is used, material is mastered primarily by resolving problems and doing practical exercises using pieces of equipment and weapons and using UTK. To do this, the text material includes all of the necessary information while conceptual material and situational links between the key elements of one specific subject or another are graphically illustrated. As the psychologists put it, the internal motivation and the cadets' conscious attitude toward studying the subject become especially important since this new form of exercises supposes their actively mastering the knowledge and skills without studying materials beforehand. But in practice people often forget about both of these. Here are but a few examples.

The motor rifle company commanded by Senior Lieutenant S. Tantsyur is going through marksmanship training and personnel are studying the parts of an automatic

weapon. The UTK that were distributed were on a totally different subject and Sergeants A. Karpov and O. Denisov are conducting the exercises in the traditional manner.

A tank unit is undergoing military medical training and the trainer is Lieutenant of Medical Services M. Tesle. The officer is restating the content of the training charts and is preparing to conduct a question-and-answer test

The divisional platoon commanders have gathered and I am able to talk with six junior officers during a break between exercises. Three of them have a vague understanding of the essence of the new methodology, although they all state that it is useful.

Lieutenant Arutyunov is addressing a meeting of active party members. He is perplexed at the disparity between the theoretical provisions of the methodology and the forms of its practical implementation.

This from a conversation with regimental staff officer Major A. Yegorov: "I feel that the problem of introducing the new methodology has basically not been resolved. The military training program has not been oriented enough on it and the consensus is that that it is not oriented toward training..."

All of these and other problems that were uncovered during the wide-scale introduction of the methodology for the phased and planned development of skills and knowledge can be explained by many reasons. First, military academies are still not teaching future commanders this method. And certainly neither the division nor the district can claim to be doing this. The introduction and confirmation of this methodology should be coordinated beforehand with other interested offices and specifically with the Main Directorate of Military Training Institutions for the USSR Ministry of Defense and the appropriate directorates of the branches of the Armed Forces.

Second, the fact that there is always an intense outflow of trained methodological experts from the division is exacerbating an already difficult situation. Turnover at the platoon and company level reaches 30-40 percent per year. And as replacements for those who were carefully trained we are getting people who, to quote the "original source," are often not competent enough and others who are simply poorly trained.

And there are a lot of problems with the sergeants, to include those who instruct. One of the speakers at a meeting of division party activists commented on the number of specialists who were pulled from their work and said that the number was a surprising 42 percent. But should we be surprised by the fact that even the sports team is part of the instructors element in the district training division. And not only is the work load on the specialists in this category not being reduced under the new conditions, it is increasing substantially.

Officers in the major unit are upset when they talk about the fact that the existing system for training primary instructors has not been improved and is not thought-out. Representatives from higher headquarters have registered many such measures, as they say, in the division, but the return has been insignificant.

Yet the methodology is nonetheless working despite problems with the personnel and the planning discrepancies and despite the fact that people are still being pulled from the training for various reasons.

A characteristic trait and one that I have heard in conversation with officers from the training division is that if it were not for the effectiveness of the new methodology, in a traditional sense there would be no sense in thinking about the results that fix the protocol for the final examination covering those two months of the summer period during which personnel are actually involved in military training. This was a startling admission.

And now let's return to the official results of the work that was done. Among the documents presented by the group that conducted the experimental training in the Main Directorate of Ground Force Military Training is a paper dated May 1986. This was a recommendation for the creation of and an activity plan for a scientific-methodological subunit (section, squad or group) as mentioned above in Captain 1st Rank Khoziyev's letter to the USSR Ministry of Defense. In looking ahead, the author of this document thought about subsequent steps in reconstructing the military training process. He specifically saw assigning the proposed subunit to jointly (along with officers from the appropriate specialties) developing general and specific training methodologies for soldiers, crews and teams on the basis of psychological and pedagogical recommendations, evaluating them in the forces and then correcting and reworking them. This group would have a minimal staffing (created by redistributing personnel from subordinate military training directorates) and would be able to monitor the course and results of introducing the new methodology, evaluate the effectiveness of practical measures, refine the existing normatives and training programs and develop new ones. Experts in this scientific-methodological subunit could develop psychological and pedagogical requirements for training and the training and methodological methods and documentation for modern equipment and weapons coming into the forces and also check that the new methodologies were being correctly applied to support the maximum and fullest use of their capabilities.

Finally, experts have begun studying the latest military training experience both in our army and in those abroad. One can hardly argue the urgency of this problem today since armies in the majority of capitalist countries have noticeably increased their search for new methods to organize military training. Moreover research of this type is actively on-going, specifically in the area of Galperin's theory, and if one can judge by the

intensity with which foreign academicians are turning to Professor P. Galperin for theoretical consultations, people in such NATO countries as the FRG, France, Belgium, Canada and Holland are showing an interest in it.

However this time as well there is a braking mechanism in operation on the path toward reorganizing and accelerating. At the very last moment people from the Main Directorate of Ground Force Military Training declined the psychologists' offer of cooperation. And this at the very moment when the question of introducing the new methodology at an extended scale was raised and when Captain 1st Rank Khoziyev had already been ordered to leave his previous duty position and actually set out to begin his new duties in the Main Directorate of Ground Force Military Training.

Thus the decision was made to transition all major Ground Force training units, units and subunits to the new methodology. The measure was progressive in every way, met the spirit of the time and facilitated putting into circulation the enormous reserves and capabilities which modern pedagogical science had revealed to the experts. And it is especially important today that we not only not let the new methodology slip, ossify and reduce its positive coefficient, but that we help it show its full power and locate and eliminate the purely scientific approach. In other words, we must not repeat the errors of fifteen years ago and put unnecessary barriers in its path.

Unfortunately there are still grounds for alarm. Representatives from several districts recently visited the training division. They looked, argued, gave advice and took with themselves not only training charts (whose quality, to include those made industrially, left much to be desired), but also doubts. When they ran into these problems, would they be able to resolve them like the "authors" of the new methodology had been able to do? Where should further research go after the psychologist-experts who had started the methodology left the main group? Would the program for training specialists be corrected for the conditions that dictated the new methodology? There are many questions and the answers to them are not easy.

After returning from an official trip, I called Boris Ilich Khoziyev (he now works at VPA [Military-Psychological Institute] imeni V. I. Lenin), an individual whose conscientiousness, adherence to party principles and persistence have to be respected. Because of the specifics of his new position he is now not involved with the problems of the methodology for the phased and planned inculcation of skills and knowledge. Simply speaking, he has been excommunicated from the affair to which he gave years of his life. But he knows the situation in the division, for people with whom he began work there call and visit him.

He says, "One can only regret that everything is being limited by half-measures. The fact is that the simplified, primitive understanding of the essence of the new methodology is not only limiting its potential, but may well compromise the idea of speeding up the training of specialists..."

12511

Weakness of Training, Readiness in Moscow Air Defense District
18010302 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Feb 88 pp 1-2

[Article by Lt Col G. Belostotskiy, Moscow Air Defense District: "Wait... Test Target" Passages in italics as published]

[Text] *The alarm signal, no matter where it finds air defense soldiers, requires that they instantaneously change their activity and subordinate their actions to the main thing—fulfilling the combat mission. As is known, such signals are also declared for training purposes. But, in one unit I heard the opinion: "They harass us so often about readiness that there is no time for military training."*

How can there be no time, I thought. Is not checking combat readiness, especially with the use of test targets, not combat training, and one of its highest forms?

Capt V. Bolshakov and the other crew members of the radio electronics battalion, as always, at the signal arrived at their work places in a timely manner. Having quickly checked the apparatus, they reported on its readiness for combat and... began to discuss the latest sports news. It is true that some soldiers waited with concentration for possible exercise inputs. They waited because it was not difficult even for novice operators to track several aircraft leisurely furrowing the "fifth ocean" at medium altitudes.

What then can be said about the experienced specialists who were located at the command post, and in the RLS [radio electronic station] and ASU [automatic control system]? Soon they were already openly bored, and thinking about how long they would have to continue to wait thus, an hour, two, or maybe the entire three? In the past this happened.

Finally the situation became clear. Lt Col L. Danilov, the battalion commander, announced over the loudspeaker:

"In sector... await a test target!"

Dozens of eyes were glued to the indicated sector of the screen. Each specialist understood that to miss the target would be a ChP [extraordinary event]. However, even this did not require greater intensity of military work. The test target differed little in its characteristics from the other aircraft. No special skill was required to detect it and track it steadily. I believe that even a single RLS crew could have done this.

Thus, almost two hours of training time, considerable resources from all the modern combat equipment in the battalion, and the electric power, were used to little effect. To put it simply, considerable resources were

thrown to the winds, and important training time was wasted. The practicing of personnel actions upon hearing the alarm was oversimplified. Why does this happen?

The main reason is that higher command posts do not always create instructive conditions of combat work for the subunits. It is no particular difficulty for the soldiers to operate according to them. Moreover, they frequently know in advance about the time and directions of target flights. And this reduces the threshold, so to speak, of surprise and suddenness, and makes it possible to prepare to meet the air "enemy" in an atmosphere of calm. It is true that, for the sake of fairness, I must note that the unit and subunit command posts know about far from all the test targets in advance. At times they suddenly "surface" at the most unexpected places, causing many leaders to become nervous. Nevertheless, there is justification to believe that the tendency that gathered force in past years toward simplifying the tasks and whitewashing shortcomings is still being manifested in the tests of combat readiness of radio electronics troops.

Some commanders, in order to try to appear at their best, attempt at any price to learn about forthcoming test target flights. But, we note, their opportunities, compared with those of the leaders of combat crews of higher command posts, are rather limited. In the episode described Lt Col Danilov received a target indication when the target had not yet been fixed by radar. Why was this done? There are no special secrets here. The appropriate senior officers "took care of him," since the evaluation of their activity depends on the evaluation of the battalion.

The sense of checking the combat readiness of the subunits through the use of a test target was lost. Moreover, this led to overcautiousness, and broke the training rhythm of those radarmen who, according to the military training plan, were to be working on other matters.

Here is yet another instance. Work on test targets has the feature that increased requirements are placed on information about them. Naturally, not every commander will risk seating young specialists at the screen. As a rule the most experienced operators carry out tracking. And what happens as a result? For such operators the conditions of the work often present no difficulty, and they work at less than full capacity. Those to whom the training exercise can be most beneficial are not involved.

This, apparently, will be the case until testing of combat readiness begins to meet fully the demands of modern combat. What are they seen to be? "In /nem, I believe, there must be most of all a complete element of surprise," states Lt Col Danilov. "The test targets must appear not only suddenly, but also correspond to the technical capabilities of the means of air attack of the probable enemy, and use his tactical techniques."

In short, when a situation is created that is as close as possible to combat, this will be a true test of combat readiness, a test by combat, and not their imitation.

At the alarm signal, as a rule, also begins a two-stage training exercise of the combat crews (the command posts of the unit and subordinate subunits). I visited one of them in the same radio electronics battalion commanded by Lt Col Danilov. It took place according to approximately the same scenario as the episode described with the test target. Powerful radio electronics equipment, a modern automated control system, and a number of first class specialists were actively involved in issuing data on the rather simple air situation, although the apparatus and people could have been used more effectively, and a more intense environment created. Why, for example, were the organic training simulator and a variety of exercise inputs not used? They could have increased the intensity of the exercise. Perhaps, in case of failure, they might look bad in front of their superiors. In short an old stereotype operated: just don't look worse than the others. I do not want to place blame solely on Lt Col Danilov for the fact that this everyday situation took root in military training. Danilov is an experienced, conscientious officer. The subunit he commands achieved good results in the last training year. One could name instead of him with full justification, say, Lt Col A. Skvortsov, or another subunit commander from this unit, about the low level of two-stage training exercises about which the newspaper NA BOYEVOM POSTY of the Moscow Air Defense District repeatedly wrote. The essence is that it is difficult for the unit to get away from customary, smooth and convenient methods of holding exercises and training. Oversimplification in military training continues to be alive and well.

Who should break the stereotype that has taken shape over the years? This is in the first place the duty of the unit command. It is, of course, not simple to destroy the past. Yes, and it is hardly possible, unless conditions are created so that the commanders themselves are interested in bringing training exercises, including the two-stage exercises, close to the conditions of real combat.

"One should not, no doubt, assess the level of military training of the subunit according to the results of such exercises," opined many of the officer-specialists with whom I spoke about this problem. I would like to add to this: There is reason to more actively support and encourage a creative approach on the part of subunit commanders toward the organization of exercises, and their desire to create a non-standard tactical environment, and in turn to be more strict with indulgences.

Officers from the staff and the various unit services can play a significantly greater role. Almost all of them are thoroughly trained, experienced specialists, who in their time served in a radar company and battalion, in a command or technical position. When they visit the "points" they can sufficiently competently assess the effectiveness of a training exercise, notice its shortcomings and render assistance. After all, it is no secret that they often decide only their own, so-called "departmental" questions. Is it not that another approach also requires more work? In order to check in more or less detail the quality of organization of military training in general, and the two-stage exercises in particular, it is necessary to train people, assign them specific tasks, and tie their actions into a unified system. Such a comprehensive approach to assessing the training level of the soldiers is still seldom found.

In recent years the level of technical equipping of the training process has increased so much that it became possible to train radar operators using the latest modern training devices. A number of units in the Moscow Air Defense District have such experience. Take, for example, the radio electronics regiment commanded by Lt Col V. Dobrynin. It is an excellent regiment, and according to the annual results was awarded the competitive Red Banner of the Moscow City Party Committee and Moscow Soviet Ispolkom. Here fundamental restructuring in military training was undertaken long ago. As the first matter they made it a rule to prepare namely the two-stage exercises especially carefully. On the eve of each of them the subunits receive appropriate programs for their organic training simulators, which model one of the possible variants of actions of the probable enemy in the unit zone of responsibility. Particularities of deployment, errors committed in the past, the nature of the training task being worked out, and other questions are taken into account.

The unit training and exercise point also required considerable effort and attention before it began to meet contemporary requirements. As a result, now the UTP [training and exercise point] not only makes it possible to train leading specialists faster, but is an excellent school of military and methodological skill for commanders, and a unique test range of advanced ideas.

Life is harsh toward those who do not hasten after the swift race of time, and remain in the power of old stereotypes that do not meet contemporary requirements. Much has been and is being done to prevent repetition of past mistakes, and raise military readiness to a higher level. However, so far one cannot say that all the urgent problems have been solved.

Navy's Persian Gulf Experience Being Wasted

18010230 [Editorial report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 February 1988 in Russian carries on page 2 a 1300-word article by Captain second rank L. Maslodudov headlined "Combat Training: The experience of the Vanguard—Tested in the Persian Gulf." Maslodudov laments the lack of communication within the navy regarding training experience gained by ships serving in the Persian Gulf. He states: "This experience is unique for our navy. It demands not only deep comprehension by the crews of Soviet military vessels fulfilling their assignments in the defense of peaceful shipping in one of the most tense areas of the world ocean. It also demands the introduction of definite corrective measures in the organization of military training in our naval bases, as well as in the supply of necessary equipment to the ships, and uniforms appropriate to the local climate as well as different kinds of rations to the sailors. How are these questions being studied in the fleets? According to my observations, still clearly insufficiently. The following fact is evidence of this: The ships which are entering duty there today for all practical purposes do not differ either in terms of the level of training or in terms of quality of supply from the ships which entered the area initially.

"Now there are probably crews in every fleet which have been through the difficult school of the Persian Gulf. They have received great experience here, they have learned lessons from earlier shortcomings and mistakes. Why has this experience not been taken up by our naval bases? I will emphasize again: It is unique and absolutely necessary for actual battle, which means that it demands an especially attentive approach. I, for example, am deeply convinced that it would be very worthwhile for those officers who are in charge of the organization of military training and the supply of the fleets' ships to spend time in the Persian Gulf. Here they could see first hand both the strong and weak points of this work. But for some reason, those with the greatest need to know how the ships and crews conduct themselves in battle conditions do not make haste to come here."

UD/336

Need for Restructuring in Naval Computer Training

18010227 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Feb 88 p 2

[Article by Cpt 3rd Rank V. Gudkov under "Perestroyka: the Naval Link: The Seaman and the Computer"]

[Text] It was in the first days of a long ocean cruise. During this time, the main task was to complete the cruise duty period as quickly and as well as possible. This required considerable effort and the attention of the ship command and entire crew. At the same time, all forms of combat training were used from the very first miles. To begin, they decided to determine our bottlenecks in a

realistic combat training situation so as to eliminate them immediately. As soon as they left the zone of a powerful storm, the signal for a practice start was sounded on the ship. An exercise to repel the attack of an air "enemy" began.

In a certain sense, present-day combat is a contest of machines, whereby computers take first place. In a particular situation, one can, of course, renounce the use of electronics and switch over to the reserve method of action, as they say. But this certainly reduces the speed of reacting to a change in the situation and of making decisions and therefore gives the opposing side more advantages, provided that it has enough electronic equipment.

During our first exercise, the "enemy" received such an advantage, even though we did not intend to give it to him. It was simply that my subordinate computer operator, Seaman A. Zemlyanov, made what one would call an error. Among his duties, in popular terms, is the control of the flow of combat information from the detection station through computers to the antiaircraft systems. Also the representation of target data on the display. The seaman performed the second task but did not handle the first.

To be honest, in my heart I did not really blame the seaman, although I did give him a stern reprimand. Zemlyanov is essentially the only seaman in the combat control unit who worked with computers before coming to serve in the navy. He knows his business. And by nature he is disciplined and industrious. If he made a mistake, then one could hardly have expected correct actions from the ship's other "computer operators." Here I had to ask myself the question: How did it happen that a rather elementary mistake was made by a professional (taking into account his civilian specialty) computer operator? The answer was really not hard to find. While at the base, for various reasons that often have nothing to do with the ship's specialists, their professional training was, to a considerable extent, theoretical. If the operators were given training, it was not comprehensive but partial and introductory. And even that was infrequent. In general, the operators had to do with "real equipment" only during the time of the examination and cranking up of equipment and technical resources. Then above all is when I should have sounded the alarm. But I did not do this and now I had to reap such "fruit."

Why did I not do it? To be completely frank, I myself did not sense any concerns. The fact is that the problem of the seaman and the computer is quite urgent. It was not so acute in using computers of older generations. But it is now becoming very much a part of our naval reality. Just take my department as an example. More than 10 percent of the draftees are working directly with computers. Of them, as already mentioned, only Zemlyanov had familiarized himself with such equipment in "civilian life." And two others—Senior Seaman A. Babkin and Seaman V. Ryapolov—have approximately the

same civilian education. But no experience! The rest had seen computers only on television before service in the navy. In this respect, the problem goes far beyond the bounds of ships. The orientation of the 27th CPSU Congress on the computerization of school education indicates that young people better trained in this connection will soon be coming to the navy as well. But this is still a matter of the future and we need operators right now. And we must train them from among those who come to us.

This is what we thought about in the department after Zemlyanov's mistake. Together with group commander Lt Vladimir Gushchin and computer engineer Sr Lt Gennadiy Karev, we carefully analyzed the existing system for training ship computer operators and made an unexpected "discovery": this system worked least of all toward what is necessary in a combat training situation, primarily simulating a kind of academic course for specialists with broad skills. It seemed that all the subjects listed in the course were necessary but somehow they were based on what was desired rather than what really is, on the fact that supposedly there are already seamen on board the ship who know computer technology and need to deepen and expand their knowledge. I do not know who prepared this list. In any case, they are people far removed from reality. For as a matter of fact, we are dealing with seamen who generally, I repeat, have the most simplified notion of computers. And we do not even have the 3 years to give them the minimum of the necessary education. For in the first year, the seaman must not only learn but also handle equipment. In short, we came to the conclusion that the program for the training of computer operators is in need of serious restructuring.

Here it must be noted that naval officers have especially broad opportunities precisely during the time of a lengthy solitary cruise for creative search in their field. In the first place, the situation of planned smooth work is standardized. No one interferes and no one imposes his own opinions or demands the fulfillment of the letter of instructions and recommendations drawn up decades ago. In the second place, the very situation of an ocean cruise helps to concentrate on the main thing for which the ship exists and establishes the basis for the intensification of combat training.

And we did begin to restructure the training of computer operators in several directions at once. We developed a new plan for lessons and specialty training. Its subjects were now such and described in such a way as to ensure that each operator quickly masters only that part of the operation that involves him directly. Only then began the mastery of the specialty in depth. We also changed the structure of the groups of lessons in the specialty. We

went from mass, so to speak, forms of instruction to individual forms. The group now includes no more than two or three people but where can we get so many leaders for this? We solved the problem in part by beginning to hold the lessons at different times, giving officers the chance to lead two groups each. But we were mainly helped by utilizing the experience of those, although few, seamen who came to the navy with a specialized education and far surpassed others in the mastery of complex electronics. Zemlyanov and Babkin began to deal with young seamen and they did so rather successfully.

I cannot fail to mention the stimulation of the combat training of computer operators during the cruise. Perhaps because this played an important role in our department. Cpt Lt I. Yusupov, deputy commander of Department 7 for political affairs, proposed and organized an interesting form of competition for these specialists. Almost daily we take the combat standards of their work and determine the winner. The results of each operator are plotted on a special chart, on which one can see both the increase in skill and the weekly and monthly winners. All of this creates an atmosphere of healthy competition in combat training.

Now, after almost 4 months at sea, you can clearly see the results of the accomplished reorganization in the training of operators. Many of them have gained more experience in these weeks than in a year of training at the base. To be sure, today it is still too early to say that we have already resolved the problem. It was not so long ago, for example, that the command did not have a lot of confidence in computer operators: at the main command post, they used a plotting board and calculations on it were preferred over machine data. It now seems that the operators have proven that they can work reliably.

I also have fears that all of our, although very modest, innovations in the training of computer operators will be abrogated on returning to the base. In part because of objective circumstances but mainly because of incongruence with some formal positions that are public and secret laws for flag specialists. I think that it is time to review these positions, in any case for specialists serving computers of the new generations. I am not complaining that precisely our experience has a right to a long life, nevertheless, I am convinced that the organization of the special training of operators of modern computers must be different from what it was a few years ago.

How? Clearly, not only we practical persons but also military scientists must seek an answer to this question. We need new recommendations and new possibilities for the mastery of this extremely complex technology by ordinary young people who come to the ship with almost "zero" electronic training.

Still, I would like to conclude my correspondence on an optimistic note. Recently the ship received a report from Reserve Chief Petty Officer A. Avilov. He served with us as a computer operator. He is now working in Moscow in a scientific research institute as a troubleshooter for computer equipment. He is very grateful to the navy for

determining his future and giving him such a specialty that is so needed in our time. It is pleasant to get such a double result: a benefit to the navy as well as to the national economy.

9746

**Lt Gen Bondarchuk: Continued Value of Security
Via Civil Defense During Renewal Process**
18010312 Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian
13 Jan 88 p 3

[Article by Lt Gen N. Bondarchuk, chief of staff—deputy
chief of Ukrainian SSR Civil Defense: "Star of the
Motherland. Strong in Ability. At Civil Defense Posts."
Passages in boldface as published]

[Text] The process of renewal and restructuring, getting
rid of stagnation and conservatism, and overcoming obso-
lete methods of work has also affected many aspects of
civil defense activity. Here there is work with cadres and
an increased role of managers at all levels for sectors of
work assigned to them, and strengthening of the political
education of personnel of nonmilitary formations.

Today there is a requirement that civil defense be ready
to resolve tasks not only for the protection of the
population in the event of enemy employment of weap-
ons of mass destruction, so long as revenge remains at
the core of the strategy and military programs of the
West, the danger of war remains, but also to ensure the
safety of the population in the event of industrial acci-
dents, catastrophes and natural disasters in peacetime.

It is well known that contemporary technologies which
were called into being by scientific and technical
progress have made control over industrial processes
more difficult. By virtue of the confluence of certain
conditions, they can fail to obey man and cause a serious
emergency situation, as occurred at the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant. Therefore, civil defense manage-
ment personnel are required to possess a high degree of
competence and efficiency and an ability to solve tasks
in the protection of the population in emergency situa-
tions.

The past year in the civil defense system has shown that
quite a few work collectives have achieved success in this
respect. Among these are the organizations of the
Shchorskiy and Kozeletskiy Rayons of Chernigovskaya
Oblast, the Dnepropetrovskiy Plant imeni Karl Liebk-
necht, the kolkhoz's "Pravda" of the Brodovskiy Rayon
and "Druzhba" of the Sokalskiy Rayon of the Lvovskaya
Oblast, and the Rakitnyanskiy sugar plant of Kievskaya
Oblast. These have acquired experience in the prepara-
tion and conduct of comprehensive exercises and train-
ing sessions.

There are quite a few managers of enterprises and
employees of GO [Civil Defense] staffs and services in
facilities of the national economy in the republic who
work creatively and who competently solve problems
that arise. Worthy of our attention is the civil defense
organization at the Kiev "Vulcan" artificial leather
plant. As a result of the purposeful work of the GO
management at the facility, laborers and office workers

are completely supplied with means of individual pro-
tection. Questions of notification are resolved in a logi-
cal way. The training of personnel of GO formations is
carried out with high standards. On the recommendation
of the party committee, communists V. Barashkov, T.
Volkov, V. Skachko and I. Bak have been appointed
training session instructors for the new training year.
They are good methodologists, and they can demonstrate
clearly the execution of one or another standard and
convincingly explain the reliability of methods of pro-
tection from weapons of mass destruction.

A training methodology assembly to develop a single
methodology of instruction was held under the manage-
ment of a facility GO staff with the instructors of
training sessions. It examined the order and sequence of
the study of program themes and the development of
civil defense standards. In summing up the results of the
assembly, Ye. Karpinski, GO chief, directed the atten-
tion of the training session instructors to the necessity of
introducing practical forms of instruction. In connection
with the shift of enterprises to cost accounting and
self-financing, the GO staff adjusted the implementation
of civil defense tasks in conformity with the new condi-
tions.

The restructuring of civil defense is gaining momentum
in the Kremenchug production association "Dormash,"
in the Voroshilovgrad enamelling plant, and in the
Ilichevsk ship repair plant imeni 50th Anniversary of the
USSR. In these collectives, party and trade union orga-
nizations make the same kinds of demands for the
training of laborers and employees in civil defense that
they do for the fulfillment of the production plan.

At the same time, a radical betterment in the practical
training of the population has not been achieved. As
previously, in a number of places (the South Ukrainian
AES [nuclear power station], the sovkhos imeni Bogdan
Khmel'nitskiy of the Pereyaslav-Khmel'nitskiy Rayon of
Kievskaya Oblast, the kolkhoz "Verkhovina" of the
Snyatinskiy Rayon of the Ivanovsko-Frankovskaya
Oblast) training sessions with the population are con-
ducted at a low level; some enterprise managers are
shying away from conducting civil defense exercises,
their material training base is poorly developed, and they
do not permit the implementation of a shift to practical
forms of training. The reasons are the low demands of
enterprise managers on their subordinates, poor control
on the part of civil defense staffs and services, and the
reluctance of individual managers to break away from
old methods of work and to get rid of yesterday's
psychology.

New thinking in the resolution of civil defense tasks is
still being introduced slowly. There are cases that are not
the exception where defects are found in filter-ventila-
tion systems, water supply, diesel electric plants, and
measurement monitoring instruments in protective shel-
ters. The training of shelter service teams in a number of
places (Zaporozhye electrical articles assembly plant,

Berdiansk meat-packing combine, Ivano-Frankovskiy obkremstroytrest [oblast repair system trust], and others is being conducted in a perfunctory way.

Therefore, among the many tasks of the new training year, which started 2 January, the most important one, as previously, is to increase the quality of instruction of the population in methods of protection from weapons of mass destruction and skillful operations under emergency conditions. Events in Chernobyl are a reminder that one should seriously master civil defense knowledge, and be able to protect oneself, the family and other people in the event of enemy employment of weapons of mass destruction, and also during industrial accidents and natural disasters.

The training of laborers, office workers and collective farmers in the new training year will be conducted according to a 20-hour program. The difference between it and the previous program is that it assigns only five compulsory subjects for 10 hours, and 2 hours are allotted for handing over civil defense standards. The other eight hours are left to the discretion of facility GO chiefs. They themselves have to determine subjects for study, taking into account the specifics of production, local conditions and the degree of proficiency in previously studied materials. Training sessions should teach civil defense notification signals and develop operational procedures in the event of a natural disaster or accident at the facility.

At the discretion of the GO chief, it is advisable to use the time allotted for the conduct of lessons at a facility for the study of methods of protection from radioactive contamination; making apartments (homes) airtight, and protecting food products and drinking water; decontamination of clothing, personal items and the work place; and evacuation procedures in emergency situations. The necessity for studying the indicated topics is prompted by events at the Chernobyl AES. The population living near the nuclear power plant was not trained for operations in a radioactive contamination situation. People did not know how to conduct themselves under conditions of an increased radioactive background; they were not taught to use means of individual protection; they did not have experience in hermetically sealing off their apartments (homes), industrial floor space, cattle-breeding farms, and the protection of food and drinking water, and they did not have the skills for decontaminating clothing, shoes and individual means of protection.

It is best to conduct training sessions according to shops, sectors, kolkhoz brigades and sovkhoz sections. Individual training also has to be encouraged. Why, for example, would it not be possible independently to develop procedures for the preparation of an apartment against the penetration of radioactive dust, to perform work on the blackout of a residence and the protection of food products against contamination, and other questions? At a designated time, the instructor of a training session

could check the performance of the task, and, if necessary, he could point out the shortcomings and ways of eliminating them on the spot.

It would be useful at facilities of the national economy to establish a Civil Defense Day. On that day, it would become the practice to hold discussions with workers and enterprise managers, and GO employees would give talks over the radio, GO standards would be received, and training films would be shown.

The task that is complex is the civil defense training of a population that is not employed in production and in the service sphere. This requires that the chiefs of staff and civil defense courses employ the most convenient methods of training for this category of the population. In addition to training sessions conducted at ZhEK's [housing operations bureaus], house-manager offices, and village (settlement) soviets, it would be advisable to conduct home discussions, question and answer evenings, meetings with GO veterans, and independent study of a reminder list "Everyone should know and be able to do this."

The organization of training sessions with the nonworking population and the dissemination of knowledge on civil defense among this category of people in many ways can be helped by civil defense activists established on social principles at GO staffs for coordination with party and trade union organizations from among the veterans of war and labor, officers and sergeants of the reserve, representatives of DOSAAF and the Red Cross and other supporters who know civil defense well and who can conduct training sessions and discussions in an interesting and intelligible way.

The level of daily readiness of civil defense is in many ways determined by the training of nonmilitary formations and their store of equipment and property. Events in Chernobyl showed that those fighting men of formations who had all-round training on civil defense questions and who were proficient in their specialties were able to handle tasks successfully. Taking this into account, it is necessary to teach personnel more topically, to cultivate well-coordinated operations and readiness to withstand difficulties, and to endure nerve and mental stress which can arise in emergency situations. And not to commit the errors of past years, when five or six exercises were held during one day. Of course, there is little benefit from that kind of training.

I especially would like to emphasize the significance of the material training base in the process of preparing personnel of nonmilitary formations and the training of the population. In recent years, the list of training base facilities has expanded significantly in enterprises, kolkhoz's and sovkhoz's of the republic. Training facilities and outdoor sectors have been built, and training posts, classrooms and civil defense rooms have been equipped.

Unfortunately, the situation is not like this everywhere. There are installations where the training facilities are primitive and do not meet current requirements. There are still training classrooms which are located in impractical basement accommodations with poor lighting, and without central heating and classroom furniture. Technical means of instructions are being introduced into the training process slowly (the Kaluga production association "Chlorvinyl", the city of Izmail in Odesskaya Oblast, and the city of Budach of the Ternopolskaya Oblast). The training base in rural localities is developing especially poorly, where the existing training facilities are in a state of neglect and are not renovated in a timely way, where plans for building up the training base are not fulfilled year in and year out (the Belozerskiy Rayon of Khersonskaya Oblast and the Sarnenskiy Rayon of Rovenskaya Oblast).

In support of the work, it is deemed advisable to conduct public showing contests everywhere for the best installation, city and rayon training material base and on this basis increase the effectiveness of the practical civil defense training of the population.

Since 1 January 1988, a majority of the labor collectives work and live under conditions of full cost accounting and self-financing. Every minute of worktime is strictly accounted for. This requires a high level of operational and organizational ability in the work of the entire civil defense managerial and command staff so that the ongoing new training year will take a step forward in its system along the path to the future improvement of civil defense.

13052

Scientific Conference at Institute of Military History

18010326 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Feb 88 p 1

[Article by Colonel V. Yeshchenko entitled: "Scientific Conference"]

[Text] A scientific conference dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the armed forces took place in the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The role of V.I. Lenin, and the CPSU in the creation and improvement of the Soviet armed forces, particularly in the restructuring in the army and navy at the present stage, were examined in the report given to the participants by Doctor of historical sciences Major General A.Babin.

The conference results were summarized by Doctor of military science Lieutenant General M. Kir'yan.

The deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Colonel General D. Volkogonov, participated in the work of the conference.

UD/335

Naval Training Reflects U.S. 'Provocations'

18010235 [Editorial report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 March 1988 publishes on page 1 a 1200-word article by Captain 3rd rank V. Trofimov, a student at the Soviet Naval Academy, on a recent training exercise at the academy. Towards the end of the article the author states: "Here is another situation from the games:

"Comrade Commander—even over the communication equipment Captain 2nd rank P. Soroka's agitation is audible—one of the 'Western' destroyers had rammed our ship, the damage is serious. I think that the collision was intentional.

"Nadezhdin is outwardly calm. Having reflected for a moment he gives the order:

"Continue executing the assignment. Draw up a naval protest and pass it on to the 'Westerners.' In the event of further provocations, maintain restraint, use weapons in self defense only on my personal command.

"The appearance of such an episode in the game is far from coincidental. In the past few years alone Soviet ship commanders have more than once had to cut short provocations by U.S. ships which demonstratively entered into Soviet territorial waters."

UD/336

Sweden Testing Fairchild Early Warning Aircraft

18010343 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Apr 88 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed 100-word article entitled: "For Long-distance Detection".]

[Text] As the journal, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, reported, in October of 1987 the Swedish Air Force received from the American company, "Fairchild," a "Metro-III" freight/passenger aircraft, equipped to conduct flight testing of an experimental model of the

PS-890 long-range radar detection system, developed by the Swedish firm, "Erickson". In addition to aerial targets the radar is able to detect ground and naval targets.

The application of a two-sided phased array SLAR antenna, installed on the upper portion of the aircraft's fuselage, and having a length of 9.1 m, a solid-state transceiver module, and light composite materials will lead to a significant reduction in weight and dimensions of the radar. It can be mounted on comparatively inexpensive and small aircraft such as the SF-340 aircraft from the Swedish firm "SAAB", and therefore, can reduce total cost of aviation systems for long-range radar detection. Sweden will have 10 aircraft with the PS-890 radar.

UD/335

TTC's: Oto-Melara Anti-tank System

18010342 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Apr 88 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed article entitled: "Antitank System".]

[Text] According to a report by the journal INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, the Italian firm, "Oto-Melara", has built a portable anti-tank missile system, the MAF. It consists of a launcher with control panel and an optical sight (total weight 23 kg) and a transport-launch container with an anti-tank missile (20 kg, diameter 22 cm, length 139 cm).

The MAF anti-tank missile has a weight of 14.5 kg, a diameter of 130 mm, and a length of 138 cm. It is equipped with launch and in-flight engines, giving the missile a maximum speed of 260 m/s, a shaped [charge] warhead weighing 4.1 kg and the capability of piercing 800mm of armor.

After launch the missile is engaged by a laser with a large angle of spread, and thereafter is guided to the target by coded laser signals, having a spread [paskhodimost] of one degree. The maximal range in good weather is 3000 m, in poor 2000 m, and the minimum range is 70 m.

According to the results of test firings, the hit probability of the MAF missile against a tank at ranges from 400 m is 95%.

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